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fidential private sector information, provides extensive protection.
As my written statement explains in detail, I believe that exemption 4 extends to virtually all of the critical infrastructure material
that properly could be withheld from disclosure.
In light of the substantial protections provided by FOIA Exemption 4 and the case law interpreting it, I believe that any claimed
private sector reticence to share important data with the government grows out of, at best, a misperception of current law. The existing protections for confidential private sector information have
been cited repeatedly over the past 2 years by those of us who believe that a new exemption is unwarranted. Exemption proponents
have not come forward with any response other than the claim that
the FOIA provides a ‘‘perceived’’ barrier to information sharing.
They have not made any showing that Exemption 4 provides inadequate protection.
Frankly, many in the FOIA requestor community believe that
Exemption 4, as judicially construed, shields far too much important data from public disclosure. As such, it is troubling to hear
some in the private sector argue for an even greater degree of secrecy for information concerning vulnerabilities in the critical infrastructure. Shrouding this information in absolute secrecy will remove a powerful incentive for remedial action and might actually
exacerbate security problems. A blanket exemption for information
revealing the existence of potentially dangerous vulnerabilities will
protect the negligent as well as the diligent. It is difficult to see
how such an approach advances our common goal of ensuring a robust and secure infrastructure.
In summary, overly broad new exemptions could adversely impact the public’s right to oversee important and far-reaching government functions and remove incentives for remedial private sector action.
I thank the Committee for considering my views.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Sobel. And finally, Professor
Steinzor.
TESTIMONY OF RENA I. STEINZOR,1 ACADEMIC FELLOW, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL AND PROFESSOR,
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND SCHOOL OF LAW

Ms. STEINZOR. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today on behalf of the Natural Resources Defense Council.
The issues before you are both significant and troubling, especially in the wake of the tragedies that began on September 11. Obviously, all Americans recognize the importance of doing whatever
we can to improve homeland security. At the same time, as Senator
Lieberman said, this country was attacked because we are the most
successful democracy the world has ever known. If we overreact to
those who attacked us so viciously, and in the process undermine
the principles and rule of law that have made us such a hopeful
example for the world, terrorists will win the victory that has thus
far eluded them.
1 The prepared statement of Ms. Steinzor with an attachment appears in the Appendix on
page 172.
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NRDC strongly opposes both the text and the underlying principles embodied in S. 1456, the Critical Infrastructure Information
Act, and urges you to consider more effective alternatives to make
Americans secure.
We oppose the legislation for four reasons. The legislation has an
impossibly broad scope. To the extent that the legislation focuses
on cyber systems, and by these I mean systems that are connected
to the Internet and therefore are vulnerable to outside disruption,
NRDC as an institution has little to add to the debate. Computers
are not our area of expertise. In fact some of us are still using the
Windows 95 operating system.
Of course, as Senator Thompson has articulated, S. 1456 extends
much further than cyber systems, covering not just computers that
are connected to the Internet, but also the physical infrastructure
used to house these systems. The legislation covers not just physical infrastructure that has or is controlled by computers, but also
any physical infrastructure that is essential to the economy and
might be damaged by a physical attack. The legislation is not limited to the Freedom of Information Act, but extends to any use by
anyone of the information in civil actions. Mr. Malcolm spoke about
the government’s use of disinformation. I would stress, however,
that this applies not just to the government but to the use of the
information in a civil action by any party.
And the legislation covers information, not just copies of specific
documents. It is a slender reed to rest on the adjective direct use
when it covers information so broadly, and information in a different format could still be precluded from use in a civil action.
NRDC is sensitive to the fears all Americans have about our vulnerability to terrorist attacks. We are active participants in the debate about whether information about the operation of facilities
during acutely toxic chemicals should be accessible on the Internet.
The Environmental Protection Agency is encountering many challenges as it works diligently to sort through these issues.
But these difficult issues are not within the areas of expertise of
the government agencies assigned a role in implementing S. 1456.
Using legislation of this kind as a vehicle for stressing how information enhances or combats the terrorist threat to physical infrastructure is unwise and duplicative. As Senator Akaka stated so
well, the legislation will have a series of disastrous unintended consequences, damaging existing statutory frameworks crafted with
care over several decades.
Let me draw in another thread of history. A few years ago major
industry trade associations, which had members subject to environmental regulations, began to push the idea of giving companies immunity from liability of the performed self-audits, uncovered violations of the law, took steps to solve those problems and turned the
self-audit over to the government voluntarily. The Department of
Justice vigorously opposed such proposals and they never made it
through Congress. Several States enacted versions of self-audit
laws. In the most extreme cases, EPA responded by threatening to
withdraw their authority to implement environmental programs
and the laws were repealed.
Self-audit bills defeat deterrence-based enforcement, creating a
situation where amnesty is available even where a company has
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continued in violation for many years and then decided to come
into compliance at the 11th hour.
As drafted, S. 1456 is a comprehensive self-audit bill that extends not just to environmental violations but to violations of the
Nation’s tax, civil rights, health and safety, truth-in-lending, fraud,
environmental, and virtually every other civil statute with the exception of the Securities Act. The legislation does not even require
that companies cure their violations in order to receive amnesty.
Redrafting may help, but it will be very hard to solve the problems
as long as the legislation covers physical infrastructure. Secrecy is
not the best way to protect critical infrastructure, and this Committee should abandon that approach. Rather, actually requiring
changes on the ground is a far preferable solution to the threats
we face.
One way to reduce the vulnerability of physical infrastructure is
to ensure that employees have undergone background checks and
that site security at the fence line of the facility and the area adjacent to vulnerable infrastructure is enhanced.
Another way to protect the public and workers is to eliminate the
need for the hazardous infrastructure, for example, a tank holding
acutely toxic chemicals. This approach, called Inherently Safer
Technologies, is the cornerstone of legislation, S. 1602, now under
consideration by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee.
NRDC has also consulted with EPA officials responsible for coordinating their agency’s contribution to strengthen homeland security. EPA has extensive legal authority to take actions against
companies that fail to exercise due diligence in protecting such attacks. The combination of the Corzine bill and administrative action will make great strides toward addressing these problems.
As the Committee continues its consideration of these issues, we
hope that you will continue to consult with a broad range of experts and stakeholders and allow us to participate in your deliberations. We appreciate the efforts of the Committee staff to undertake these discussions in order for all of us to better understand
the policies, goals and implications of the legislation. Thank you.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Professor.
Let me see if I can ask a few of you to give a little more detail,
without disclosing exactly what you do not want to disclose, which
is what are we talking about here with sensitive information? Mr.
Paller, in your testimony you gave us a series of examples. I wonder if any of the rest of you, Mr. Sagalow or Mr. Gent, could give
us a little more general information about what we are talking
about that people you represent or you yourselves would not want
to disclose without this kind of exemption from FOIA?
Mr. GENT. Senator, you might remember back, I believe it was
your freshmen year this Committee held hearings, and not much
has changed about the electric system vulnerability since then. And
one of the problems back then was that they wanted us to build
a list of critical facilities, ‘‘they’’ being the government, so that the
government could analyze that and be prepared to help us defend
at those facilities at that time from physical attack of nations or
nation states or terrorists. Not much has changed. We now have
the cyber element that goes into this.
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So government agencies are asking us to come forth with lists of
critical facilities along with their degree of vulnerability and what
would happen if this facility were taken out. And we have, for the
last 20 years, said that we are not going to build such a list. As
others have testified, we have no confidence that the government
can keep that a secret.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Got it. Mr. Miller, do you have an example that comes to mind, generally speaking?
Mr. MILLER. In the information technology industry there might
be a product that is developed, a software product, which in most
formats works fine, but in conjunction with a certain hardware,
which a lot of these things are integrated with, different types of
hardware, in fact there is a vulnerability. The software vendor may
become aware of that, may decide that it wants to communicate
with, however, a very limited audience, for example—just its immediate customers and clients because of that relationship, but would
be totally unwilling to share that with the government because it
does not want to face the possibility of broad public disclosure of
that.
Again, we are talking about limited cases, not a massive virus
attack, where as was discussed in the previous panel, everyone
wants to work together to get the word out about a Code Red or
a Nimda. We are talking about a particular—the technical term is
‘‘configuration’’ of a particular software product, where the impetus
is to keep it in a closed community unless otherwise they are
incented to do so, and particularly to share it with the government
would bring a lot of risk because of this possibility, or Senator Bennett, maybe it is just the paranoia business, the likelihood that if
you share it with government it will end up being disclosed.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Sagalow.
Mr. SAGALOW. Mr. Chairman, I will give you two examples of information, falling into the areas of best practices that might be
shared if there was a FOIA exemption. When it comes to the
Nimda virus, Code Red, those massive attacks, that information is
being shared. What is not being shared is information on risk management techniques, best practices, corporate governance, and I
will give you two examples.
If a corporation becomes dissatisfied with their particular vendor,
one antitrust software works very poorly and they end up deciding
to terminate that contract and instead incorporate another antivirus software, you would want that information to be shared. A
general counsel would be extremely reluctant to give their CEO or
CTO permission to share that type of information, fearing potential
defamation lawsuits from the vendor that you ended up dropping,
as well as from other people for other causes of action like tortious
interference with a contractual relationship.
The second example I would give you is potential shareholder actions arising out of disclosure of company practices and technology
use. There is a business issue of whether you want to disclose these
things since some may regard them as trade secrets. However, if
all the CEOs of the world were similar to Mr. Bennett, they would
disclose a certain amount of what is arguably a trade secret if it
is consistent with protecting our national infrastructure and the
good of society, as long as it did not do undue harm to the com-
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pany. A general counsel is not going to take that attitude. A general counsel is going to say even though it is the right thing to do,
there are professional plaintiff attorneys out there that will start
shareholder derivative actions alleging that the act of disclosure
itself was a breach of fiduciary duty.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Paller made a statement which was very frank and sounded
pretty realistic, that even with the exemption proposed, that there
will be companies who will not share because they are still concerned in a voluntary system that it will not really be kept confidential, and therefore—not that he was recommending this,
maybe he was—but that we may need a mandatory system.
Now, I wonder whether, real quickly because I want to get on to
another question, whether the three of you agree or disagree, if we
had appropriate exemption from FOIA do you think companies
would still withhold information?
Mr. GENT. I think if you made it mandatory, they would not
withhold.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. [Laughter.]
Mr. MILLER. I would strongly disagree with Mr. Paller. First of
all, I do not know what it would mean to be mandatory and I do
not know how you would possibly enforce that, but I think the information sharing is growing. Again, I agree that the FOIA is not
the silver bullet, Senator, but for the interest of the industry, yes,
there is growing in the communities, electrical, financial services
IT, that there is a broader community interest because these people
who are American citizens. They want to support the good of the
Nation. But they have to be protected on the down side. That is
clearly the establishment of the ISACs, the establishment of the
partnerships, that sharing of information through InfraGard is a
commitment the industry is making.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Sagalow.
Mr. SAGALOW. Our members have told us that if these obstacles
are removed, there will be a substantial increase in disclosure. Of
course some people will never disclose no matter what, but there
will be a substantial increase.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Professor Steinzor, let me ask you your
reaction to the conversation on the last panel, which was: Why
would not your concerns about the effect of the passage of Senator
Bennett’s legislation on various environmental laws be eliminated
by inserting language that said that nothing in this proposal
should diminish any obligation that anyone has under any other
system of law?
Ms. STEINZOR. That would go a long way to help, but we would
still be required to fight over such issues as whether there was an
obligation, there was no obligation, and whether the information
was submitted before the government asked for it. The way this
bill is drafted it says that information is voluntarily submitted in
the absence of such agency’s exercise of legal authority. So the
agency would have to actually ask for the information in order for
it to be submitted non-voluntarily. At the moment, there is a lot
of information kept in companies that the government may not
have asked for yet, and if it was submitted voluntarily, the protec-
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tion could be asserted. That is just one of the kinds of problems
that we are concerned about.
Another way to deal with what you are talking about is a savings
clause. Such a clause should be something that is dynamic, not just
for laws that are on the books today but laws that are added to
the books in the future.
And one last thing I would like to add, which is that to the extent that the information we are concerned about here is information that is time-sensitive, one way to approach it would be to say
the protection only lasts for a certain limited period of time. We
have heard a lot about an attack is ongoing and you need to share
the information. Arguably, once you have shared it, once the problem is addressed, as we all assume it will be, you no longer need
to make that information secret. Keeping it secret is only important to liability down the line. Again, there would be no liability
if the problem was solved. So that is another way to approach this.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Sobel, do you have a reaction to that
discussion on the first panel? I know is it not directly responsive
to your concerns.
Mr. SOBEL. Frankly, Senator, my concern is with this taken in
combination, the fact that there would be no possibility of disclosure apparently at any time running into the future, as well as no
real governmental ability to address any of the vulnerabilities that
are made known to the government, and then there is this provision that I read as a very broad immunity that would also preclude
any private actors from seeking corrective action. So what I see,
taken as a whole, is this structure that provides information to the
government, but then really ties the hands of the government or
anyone else to direct and compel corrective action. As I said, I
think this approach protects the negligent as well as the diligent,
and that is really, I think, the main flaw. Yes, we can certainly assume that many, if not most, of the actors in the private sector are
going to be good actors, but it seems to me that this just creates
an incredibly large loophole for those companies that frankly are
more inclined to be negligent than diligent.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks. Senator Bennett.
Senator BENNETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to everyone on the panel including those who were not quite as supportive of my legislation as some of the others, because these are
obviously the issues that have to be resolved, that have to be
talked about.
I sponsored a bill for a long time on the privacy of medical
records, and ran into much the same kind of very firm opinions on
all sides of the issue, and I kept saying year after year, this is not
an ideological issue, this is not conservatives versus liberals or Republicans versus Democrats. This is a management issue. How do
we solve the problem? And my staff got sick and tired of me saying
it. I would say, if there is a management problem raised by this
objection, let us solve the problem rather than put ourselves into
ideological camps and then scream at each other? We do a great
deal of that in the U.S. Senate, usually on the floor, less so in committee, but we have a serious challenge here. It is one for which
there is, frankly, no historic predicate because the coming of the information age has changed the world as thoroughly and fundamen-
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tally as the coming of the Industrial Age did. And if you are going
to talk about agricultural age warfare after the invention of the repeating rifle, you are going to be left behind. And the statement by
Osama bin Laden is a chilling reminder of the fact that we live in
an entirely different world, and we all, on all sides of this issue,
need to view that world differently.
Now, if I were someone who wished this country ill, and I have
said this before so I am not giving out any secrets, if I were someone who wished this country ill, I would be concentrating on breaking into the telecommunications infrastructure over which the
Fedwire functions. If I could shut down the Fedwire, I could bring
all activity in the country to a complete stop. No checks would
clear. No financial transactions would take place. There could be no
clearing at the end of every day for the Federal Reserve system.
The Fedwire is the absolute backbone of everything that goes on
in the economy. And I have had conversations with Chairman
Greenspan about protecting the Fedwire from cyber attack. That
specter before us, how do we deal with the challenge of telephone
companies, of power companies, of brokerage houses, banks, and
the Federal Government itself, that are tied together in this absolutely intricate network of transactions and facilities, and protect
the Fedwire from someone sitting in a cave somewhere coming
after it?
Now, Mr. Miller could share some information with us, which I
have seen, that shows the graphs of the level of attacks that have
come against the United States, cyber attacks, and it is a logarithmic scale. It is not just a quiet little incremental increase every
year. It is almost Malthusian in terms of the predictions, and it is
a hockey stick. And I have stood in the rooms where these attacks
are being monitored in real time, second by second, in the Defense
Department within the Pentagon. The interesting things is that
just as the number of attacks is going up logarithmically, the sophistication of the attacks is going up logarithmically, so that our
ability to defend ourselves, which is also going up logarithmically,
is just barely keeping up with the sophistication and volume of the
challenge that we have.
I first became aware of this with Y2K when I was talking with
Dr. Hamre, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, as we were trying to
find out in a hearing on S. 407, Mr. Chairman, over in the Capitol,
where we can have classified briefings, about the degree of this
country’s vulnerability, and Dr. Hamre said to me, ‘‘We are under
attack every day.’’ And this was 3 or 4 years ago. And I said,
‘‘Under attack, what are you talking about?’’
Well, the attack on the government facilities goes on. My fear,
the thing that keeps me awake at night is that if those who are
mounting those sophisticated attacks on government facilities—and
they are primarily aimed at the Defense Department and the intelligence community, CIA, NSA and others—were to shift their focus
onto the private sector and do so in a timing and a circumstance
where no one in the government knew that that shift had taken
place, how vulnerable are we, and how will we feel if we say, ‘‘Well,
we did not facilitate the opportunity for people who are the recipients of those attacks to share with the government what was happening.’’ This is not questioning. I am just responding to the panel
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and sharing with you my deep, and I hope not paranoid, desire to
see to it that we are prepared for this.
So in the one minute left before we go back to the second round,
do any of you, recognizing this is a management issue rather than
an ideological issue, have any comments across the gap that has
occurred within the panel, that are not just, oh, you are wrong, you
do not understand. It is easy for you to say that back and forth to
each other. Do any of you have any solutions that you could suggest across the divide that has been created here within this panel
in the circumstance that I have framed?
Mr. MILLER. Just a brief comment. I thought that Mr. Sobel and
Professor Steinzor said that with some of the limitations that
Chairman Lieberman suggested, and Mr. Malcolm discussed it in
the earlier panel with you as the primary sponsor, that they might
see some possibility of bridging the gap. Again, these are technical
legal issues beyond my exact area of expertise, but I was pleased
to hear that both Mr. Sobel and Professor Steinzor indicated that
they might—if the language of the bill was even more clear as not
to allow the worst bad actors to use the Freedom of Information
Act language to hide behind—that they might be open to some kind
of compromise. And I thought that was a very positive statement
by both of them from my perspective.
Ms. STEINZOR. Senator, I could not agree with you more that this
is an enormous challenge and a grave threat, and I am not by any
stretch of the imagination questioning your motives or your sense
of urgency about all of this. What is troubling to us is that it would
seem as if a more direct way to approach this would be to try and
develop technologies like the one Mr. Paller was talking about, to
erect firewalls and make cyber systems more secure, rather than
simply allowing for a shroud of secrecy to go over them because of
the difficulties of drawing lines in this area.
You know the Freedom of Information Act, in our experience, is
one of the most ponderous legal tools one can ever use. It takes
months, years, to get a request answered. And so we are puzzled
why the urgent exchange of information could not be protected in
a short timeframe in a different way that does not implicate the
Freedom of Information Act, which we do not see as a very grave
threat to the immediate exchange of information. People are talking about perceptions on all sides, and we are puzzled by that.
Mr. SOBEL. Senator, if I could just follow up on that, on the FOIA
point. I have a real concern that a new exemption approach could
actually muddy the waters far more than they are right now. We
have heard a lot of concern about the advice that a general counsel
might give within a company in terms of whether or not there is
adequate protection or not. It seems to me, as an attorney who
looks at these issues, that 28 years worth of very clear case law
would give me much more comfort in advising a client than a
newly-enacted piece of legislation that contains some very broad
language. I think if I was that general counsel and this legislation
passed, I would say, ‘‘Well, you know, this has not yet been judicially construed. We do not know how much protection this is going
to provide.’’ I would feel much more comfortable looking at the
Critical Mass decision from the D.C. Circuit, where the Supreme
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Court denied certiorari, and saying, ‘‘This is a pretty good assurance that this information is not going to be disclosed.’’
So I do not think we are disagreeing about goals, but I think
there is a real question in terms of what is the most effective way
of providing the assurance that the private sector seems to want.
Mr. MILLER. Maybe that is what the hypothetical general counsel
would believe, Senator Bennett. That is not what the real general
counsels believe.
Mr. SAGALOW. Senator, let me follow up if I can.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Sagalow, let me just interrupt.
Senator Bennett, I do not have any other questions. I have a couple of colleagues waiting to see me. If you are able, I would like
to ask you to continue the discussion, and then when you are
through, to adjourn the hearing.
Senator BENNETT. That is very dangerous on your part. [Laughter.]
Chairman LIEBERMAN. I do not want you to get comfortable with
the gavel though. [Laughter.]
Senator BENNETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LIEBERMAN. Not at all. Thank you for your leadership.
It has been a very interesting, important, constructive hearing, and
I look forward to continuing to work with you, Senator Bennett,
and with those who have been before us to see if we can resolve
this in the public interest. Thank you.
Senator BENNETT [presiding]. Thank you very much.
Now, having no constraints upon me, I would like to pursue this
a little further.
Mr. SAGALOW. Senator, if I could just respond to a couple of the
comments that were mentioned earlier. My company created something called a Technology Alliance, which is a group of technology
companies that advise us as underwriters on evaluating cyber risk,
and we have been literally talking to dozens of technology companies over the last 2 years and we continue to talk to them.
I can tell you, Senator, that without exception there is no technology company that believes that there is a technology silver
bullet. There is no super firewall. There is no super anti-virus or
intrusion detection system. There is no single technology or combination of technologies that will solve this problem.
On the second issue of the theoretical versus practical general
counsel, I agree with the comments of my colleague, Mr. Miller. I
do not know what theoretical general counsels say, but I know
what they say to me every day. And what they say to me every day
is their view of current law and regulation including case law does
not give them a sufficient basis to recommend to their CEOs to disclose. More legislation, more action is needed.
Senator BENNETT. Let me follow through on that one.
We have always been under the impression that we were helping
FOIA by focusing and defining the exemption which, Mr. Sobel, you
indicated has been done by case law so as to make it clear that in
this circumstance under these conditions the broad exemption that
is already in FOIA would clearly apply and that we were not in
any way repealing or destroying FOIA, we were simply focusing the
definition.
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Now, Mr. Sagalow, let us go back to you—recognizing you have
not had this discussion, but your perception of how a general counsel would react. Do you think that the passage of this legislation
would be viewed in that regard and therefore make a general counsel more likely to say let us go ahead, or do you think they would
react to the legislation somewhat in the way that Mr. Sobel is? You
do not have to agree with his opinion of where they are in case law,
as to try to say maybe he is right that they would say, ‘‘Well, the
legislation may sound good, but it is still not going to give me any
comfort.’’
Mr. SAGALOW. I do not know. It is a legitimate issue. I believe
that, based upon the conversations that I have had so far, that the
majority of general counsels would be looking at it in the first approach. They would be looking at this legislation clarifying existing
case law in a way favorable toward disclosure as opposed to a de
novo aspect of legislation that they would feel uncomfortable with
until years of case law interpretation.
Senator BENNETT. Let us go back to Professor Steinzor’s comment about time. I think that is a very legitimate issue that she
has raised. I have used the example which, frankly, Professor, you
shoot down, that Osama bin Laden would mount an attack and
then file a FOIA request to find out how well it worked, and if indeed FOIA would require 4 years before he got the information, the
technology would have been about five generations old by the time
he got the information.
She has raised an interesting question, gentlemen, about putting
a time limit on this, where you say the FOIA request cannot be
filed for 3 years, let us say, pick a number. She would probably
pick 3 months, but let us pick a number and put a timeframe on
this, and talk about what effect that might have in the real world.
Mr. Gent.
Mr. GENT. Senator Bennett, there are certain operational information that can be made availble moments afterwards, some hours
afterwards, some days afterwards, but when it comes down to the
configuration and vulnerability of the electric system, this is something that evolves over decades. So having information, in fact, to
be honest with you, some of the information that is now being released to the public is still very dangerous and could be considered
as a terrorist handbook. So the configuration has not changed that
much. The components that are vulnerable have not changed that
much over the last decade. So if you talk about operational information, I would be willing to talk about a shorter timeframe, but
physical configuration of a system is still important after decades.
Senator BENNETT. We need to remember, and you have reminded
us, that the physical and the cyber are inextricably linked here.
Mr. GENT. We believe that. In fact, Hoover Dam is not going anywhere.
Senator BENNETT. But the ability to break into the computers
that are updated that control the sluice gates, somebody could open
the sluice gates and drain Hoover Dam without blowing it up. Is
that an accurate——
Ms. STEINZOR. But, Senator, that again is a cyber issue which
presumably would be addressed by technology evolving within a
certain period of time because cyber systems are changing all the
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time. I think the emphasis on the physical configuration is exactly
what concerns us because a lot of the physical configuration, for example, at a chemical plant, is heavily scrutinized and regulated by
the government. And again, this protection does not just apply to
Freedom of Information Act, it always applies to use in a civil action which could be either enforcement or some other type of action
that would not be able to proceed if the company was not continuing to do something wrong.
So again, my suggestion about the temporal aspect is that the assumption must be that once we discover vulnerability, we are going
to address it right away, whether it is in the physical context or
the cyber context, that the Freedom of Information Act in civil actions would only be viable if those problems were not addressed,
and therefore a temporal limitation might be just the ticket to solve
the problem.
If I could just add one more thing. As an educator of young lawyers, let me talk about the theoretical versus the actual general
counsel. One of the things we always impress on our students is
the need to zealously protect their clients’ interests, and while I
would sign up tomorrow to be your general counsel, you being the
hypothetical CEO——
Senator BENNETT. You might not be in a financially successful
institution. [Laughter.]
Ms. STEINZOR. Well, but you were articulating such good ethics
and good sense, that I think I might do it. Maybe I could keep my
university job.
The problem is that if there is an opportunity to do a document
dump, which of course would not be conceived in those pejorative
terms, that it is both a theoretical and actual general counsel
would be pushing the company to do exactly that. They would say,
‘‘Look, CEO, we have vulnerabilities involing our physical infrastructure that are very serious, and we should go contact Governor
Ridge about those and get into some conversation with him, and if
any agency tries to pursue us through one of the more mundane
daily laws, we can fend them off while we address our
vulnerabilities.’’ This kind of situation is our concern.
I should have brought a lawyer joke for the occasion.
Senator BENNETT. I have plenty of those.
Ms. STEINZOR. Good.
Senator BENNETT. Anyone want to respond to that? Mr. Miller.
Mr. MILLER. Not so much to that, but your earlier question about
time limitations. It is easy for me to say sure, why not in the information technology industry because 3 years is an eternity. But
again, it is very much tied to physical issues.
A certain governor of a certain large State just to the north of
here, about 4 years ago was very proud to release a document on
the Internet that showed where every telecommunications, electrical network, and critical asset in the Commonwealth of his State
was located, and it was very public, it was very well known. I am
sure Tom Ridge was very proud of that at the time he was governor, because everyone was into disclosure using the Internet. I
am sure looking back from his current position, Tom Ridge wonders
how he had that crazy idea 4 years ago to make that information
public.
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So I would think, Senator, we need to consult with a lot more
people who are, as Mr. Gent was suggesting, involved in these
long-term fixed positions that may or may not be controlled by
cyber relationships before we would say that the time limit idea intrinsically is a good idea.
Again, in principle, I do not think the IT industry would be too
much concerned about that, but I think a lot of our customers
might be because those physical assets do not change and those
physical vulnerabilities do not change for long periods of time.
Senator BENNETT. Without treading into classified territory, because in this whole process I have spent an awful lot of time in
places that deny that they exist after I leave them, as a general
principle, someone who is looking over critical infrastructure needs
to know key points. And the key point in the critical infrastructure
can be taken out with a kinetic weapon many times more efficiently than it can be taken out with a cyber attack. The interesting thing that comes from those who analyze this—and I must
be careful about this—the interesting thing that comes from those
who analyze this for a living is that the key points in a critical infrastructure are very often not obvious. There might be a particular
switch in a particular pipeline or a particular telecommunications
switch, or a substation that for some reason is far more critical
than any other in terms of possibly shutting down the power grid.
A terrorist would give a tremendous amount to know where those
key points are. And I am not sure the people who are giving information to the government, if my bill was to pass, would themselves
know how key they are or where they are.
And the question becomes—the government could put that together. The government says, ‘‘OK, we have got this from this
source. We have got this from this source. Uh-oh.’’ Back to my
original analysis if I am going to mix metaphors here. If this particular facility goes down, that is what shuts down the Fedwire.
And the people who manage that facility do not know that. If that
information—that is the pieces of information that allowed the government to discover that are individually made available with
FOIA, and an analyst working for a hostile nation state comes to
the same conclusion that our analyst came to, and said, ‘‘Aha, this
is the one thing which if we shoot down, cuts down the Fedwire.’’
And that become very valuable information, and maybe they make
the decision, ‘‘We are not going to go after it in a cyber way. We
are going to get somebody with a truck full of fertilizer to pull up
to the front door of that particular facility and lo and behold everybody is going to be surprised because they think they have all of
these technological firewalls everywhere else to protect the
Fedwire, and bingo, we can take it out with a fertilizer bomb.’’
Now, that is obviously a hypothetical and obviously that kind of
analysis is going on. But that is the kind of concern that I have
about sharing information. And it may well be that we could find
a division here between some things that could be disclosed after
a 3-year period and some things that could not. I can anticipate
some of you are going to say, ‘‘Well, you are not going to know that
in advance,’’ but let us at least have a quick round on that concern.
Mr. PALLER. I think you go back to the bigger question that your
staff got mad at you about, about understanding it is a manage-
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ment problem. And what I see happening here is what happens in
lots of security conversations, which is different people looking at
different parts of the animal. (1) If that is what you are going to
disclose, it is terrible, and (2) if that (other thing) is what you are
going to disclose, it is fine. I think maybe this is one of those really
hard slogging jobs where you have to go systematically through
every specific type of data in every specific type of environment and
get the answers to the questions of which are going to be disclosed
and which are not going to be disclosed if you want to get consensus in the room. I am not sure that the effort is going to be
worth the trouble, but I do not see a way, as long as you keep a
very broad view of what the ‘‘it’’ is, to get them to agree how long
or when or whether to disclose it.
Mr. MILLER. Senator, I do not know whether it has to do directly
with FOIA legislation. I mean clearly the issue of saying we do not
know what we do not know is a real problem. Let me give you an
obvious lesson that was learned on September 11, and that is redundancy in telecommunication systems. A lot of companies had
learned over time, as part of business continuity planning, to have
redundancy in their telecommunication systems, which meant having two carriers, two switches, and two sets of pipes. But a lot of
companies put those switches and those pipes in exactly the same
building, the World Trade Center. So when the World Trade Center
went down they really did not have redundancy. They ended up not
having complete telecommunication systems left. And so that was
a lesson that was learned, or at least it was put out there. I am
not sure whether it has been completedly learned. We are still having this debate with the Federal Government as you know, and
there is legislation in Congress to require Federal agencies to begin
to think about having true physical redundancy as opposed to assumed physical redundancy in telecommunication systems.
So frequently we do not know what we do not know, and we have
to have a tragedy or a direct experience to learn that lesson.
Would the FOIA exemption you are suggesting help that to come
together? Perhaps because who, other than the government, does
exactly what you say, which is to look at all of the pieces of the
puzzle. At the end of the day, his companies look at the electricity
industry, I look at the IT industry, Mr. Sagalow and financial ISAC
members look at the ISAC industry. Mr. Paller kind of looks across
industries because he has got experts in all of these. But at the end
of the day it is only the government that looks at the overall view
of how these interdependencies really work in ways that nobody
else really can.
Mr. SOBEL. Senator, I just wanted to make the observation that
it seems to me that there is a little bit of a disconnect in terms of
industry’s attitude here. I mean on the one hand we are being told
that the agencies that would receive the information are somehow
so incompetent that they would be releasing highly sensitive information in response to a FOIA request despite very strong case law
supporting withholding, and yet on the other hand industry seems
to believe that there is something valuable that the government
has to tell them or something valuable the government has to do
in the form of coordinating response activity. So I am not getting
a clear picture from industry in terms of how they see government.
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Is government a competent, useful player here or is it something
else, an entity that is going to receive information and very haphazardly release it to the detriment of all of us?
So I really am hearing two things here.
Senator BENNETT. My answer to that question would be yes.
[Laughter.]
Mr. SOBEL. Well, then I think it raises——
Senator BENNETT. There is no such thing as industry and there
is no such thing as the government. There are a variety of companies in a variety of industries. It is enormously complex, and as you
have indicated, the vast majority of them would be very disciplined
and act in a responsible way. And there are few, in your opinion,
that would not, that would be irresponsible and would try to use
this in an improper fashion. There are a variety of people in government who are enormously competent and who would provide
the analysis that we need, and there are a variety of people who
have demonstrated a regulatory mentality to which I referred earlier, that would use the information in a way just to prove their
regulatory muscle that would be irresponsible. You only have to sit
in a Senator’s office to discover that there is no, ‘‘the Government.’’
There are a variety of human beings, some of whom, most of whom,
act responsibly and intelligently, and every once in a while there
are some regulators who just defy common sense in the way they
do their jobs and hang on to the regulations that they have.
So my answer to your question, without being facetious, is yes
to both sides of it.
Mr. SOBEL. I think that is very true, but as Mr. Tritak said, if
this is a question of trust and establishing trust, I do not understand why that same regulator is suddenly going to be trusted by
the industry submitter to comply with your new FOIA exemption
if he is not trusted to comply with the existing protections. In other
words, if this is an incompetent or malicious bureaucrat, why
would this new legislation create any greater trust on the part of
the submitter? That is what I am really missing here.
Senator BENNETT. All you can hope for is that you nudge him in
the right way.
Mr. SAGALOW. Senator, if I could just emphasize on that last
point you mentioned, because that is exactly what is happening. In
the real world everything is a gray area and what you need to do
is nudge the general counsel in the right way. What I am hoping
that you are hearing from at least the majority of people that are
speaking on this area is a desire not to throw the baby out with
the bath water, that this is a very essential piece of legislation,
very important to the national infrastructure and our war against
terrorism, and that the people on both sides of the aisle, so to
speak, are willing to look at language in the bill consistent with the
fundamentals: That data is received through independent use
would be exempted, that under certain circumstances criminal
prosecution if documented through that independent use would be
permitted, that certainly it is not the intention of the legislation,
and none of my members are indicating they expect it to be the intention of the legislation, that the legislation will somehow allow
a company not to disclose what they would otherwise be obligated
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to disclose, whether in the criminal area, the environmental area,
or the financial area.
Two other quick comments. My personal belief is that the fear
of data dumping or the bad general counsel while not unrealistic,
is perhaps overstated. General counsels have a firm belief in the
law of unintended consequences. That is why they are hesitating
to permit disclosure in the first place. And part of the law of unintended consequences is if you do a data dump thinking that you
are going to fool the other side, something is going to go wrong.
Very few general counsels take that risk unless it is a matter of
utter desperation.
And then finally on this issue of the temporal solution to the
problem, I can only echo the point that was made earlier, that this
issue of ‘‘we do not know what we do not know’’ is quite important.
We really do not know in any set of documents or data what are
the fundamental issues that may be completely applicable 5, 6, or
10 years from now.
Senator BENNETT. Well, the audience is voting with their feet in
saying that the hearing is over. May I thank all of you for your
contribution. This has been a serious discussion rather than a simple venting of opinions, and I am grateful to all of you for your willingness to enter into it in that spirit.
If I were to summarize my attitude, and speaking solely for myself, obviously, and not for any other Member of the Committee, I
wish we had the time to go through all of the issues and ultimately
come, as has been suggested here, to a final consensus where everybody buys off and agrees, because I think people of goodwill at
all aspects of this probably could arrive there.
I must share with you once again, I feel a sense of urgency here
which is very powerful, and the more time I spend with the intelligence community, the more time I spend in the Defense Department, the more times I visit that room in the Pentagon, where the
attacks on our military infrastructure come in in real time and I
see them on the screen, the more sense of urgency I have.
I think we err on the side of exposing our country and really with
exposing the American economy, exposing the world to serious
damage if we delay too long. And I would rather take steps as
quickly as we can that start us down the road and maintain a perfect willingness to change the legislation as we get examples of serious violations of environmental or other circumstances by the
small minority of companies that might try to take advantage of
that, than delay the legislation until we can theoretically iron out
all of the problems.
I do not wish to be an alarmist. I try not to be an alarmist, but
I think this is an issue that requires early action. And that is why
I am grateful to the Chairman for his willingness to schedule the
hearing, and I am grateful to all of you for your willingness to participate.
With that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
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